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DELTA LEGACIES
IN
LAUNCH COST REDUCTION

By
Philip W. Payne

ABSTRACT

Delta launches nave had a high success ratio. One factor has oeen
successful field processing. Review of hard experience and study of critical
costs, produced a test philosophy which led to development of improved methods
and equipment. This test philosophy saw several virtues in the minimization
of human access to flight hardware, both in and out of test.
Planning and precision were the adopted characteristics of "people
performance."
Automation and mechanization of test exercises and of
data-taking were implemented by launch site concepting, designing, and
fabricating special test equipments. These are illustrated and discussed.
The success of these methods and equipments has had time to mature in
routine use. Evaluation indicates they made a major contribution to the
outstanding cost effectiveness and reliability of the DELTA LAUNCH VEHICLE.
INTRODUCTION

Delta Project Management established a
Delta strategy of simplicity, economy and
progressive, but very careful, growtn.
Largely ignored by greater movements in the
federal machinery, the Delta persisted and
performed. It endured, grew and provided
service to a wide range of customers over
many years. The last US Delta launched at
this writing (March 1984) was number 174,
the 40th consecutive success of the
complete vehicle. Japan bought a transfer
of
Delta
technology
from
McDonnell
Douglas. All J3_ of the Japanese launch
vehicles
performed
through
injection
properly.
No satellite-launching rocket
has equalled that record.

The Delta Program began in 1959. It
has run twenty-five fruitful years and
launched more than 200 satellites with
perhaps the most efficient space rocket
serving
the
scientific
and
civilian
community.
Now the end of the Delta
Program may be in sight.
Only five
American launches remain scheduled, three
this year. This paper, in reporting the
origin and ontogeny of Delta's field
processing
methods,
may
serve
the
operational refinement of other present or
future programs.
BRIEF HISTORY

Out of the 174 multi-stage American
Delta vehicles
launched,
all
stages
performed as required on 163.
Eleven
failed to carry out their mission. This
record of reliability is high among its
peers.
The preponderance of the 11
failures occurred in the first half of the
program, seven in the first 86 launches.

First launch of a Delta was May 13,
1960. It carried an Echo passive balloon
satellite and was unsuccessful due to a
second stage attitude control
system
malfunction. Following a path thereafter
of relative- success, as compared with other
launch venicles, Delta continued through
generations of technical growth. Under a
very small management team which allowed it
to be efficient, the Delta found new uses
and customers beyond che first buy of 12
vehicles. Goddard Space Flight Center's

The four failures in the last 88 launches
have all been caused by latent flaws
(structural or component failure) not
detectable in field processing.
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This success has been due to a few
(1) The basic Delta.
elemental factors:
hardware has been a sound product, well
screened and tested in manufacture, of
design as simple as possible consistent
with its mission, and, in ruggedness,
somewhat forgiving -- even without much
redundancy. (2) The people of the Delta
Program have been talented and dedicated,
enduring and motivated -- because all
stages of the Delta, as well as software
and flight predictions, have been uhe
product of one company, because the program
because
and
simple,
is
organization
communications therefore have always tended
(3) Field
to be personal and easy.
refined
developed
have
operations
disciplines in that final arena of flight
preparations and high-cost consequences.
Cost of the Delta has been modest,
owing to tacit program policies: (1) To
shun unnecessary complexity and (2) to
the
where
developments
new
avoid
already
elements
of
extemporization
perfected for other programs could be
availed. Delta was an outgrowth of Thor
They paid its primary
and Vanguard.
development cost. The use of available
systems has been a Delta hallmark. For
years the second stage engines were excess
lunar-lander engines. The first stage main
engines for the last 78 Deltas manufactured
have been repackaged surplus engines from
the Saturn I-B program. The first stage
hydraulic system was modified to use
"surplus 11 Saturn IV-B integrated "power
The Delta flight computer and
pacs".
an
is
system
guidance
strapped-down
adaption of the "lunar lander backup
further
recently
system,
navigation
developed for Delta by McDonnell Douglas to
add! redundancy. It has flown successfully
in all 91 (including Japanese) of its
flights,
In terms of payload-value delivered per
dollar actual cost,, the Delta exceeds other
satellite-injecting rockets. Until now STS
users have been charged token costs to
i nduce t he i r par t i c i p ati on. Actual cost
comparison with the Delta woulci 5e unfair
until after greater STS matoring.

In terms of Government dollars outlaid
for development, the availability of Delta
as an American tool has been acnieved for
the users of the world at very low cost.
This is because, first constructed out of
Delta
the
elements,
other-developed
improvements were fully amortized on
programs such as Thor, Vanguard, and
Saturn.
Commercial and foreign users have been
and
growth
of
costs
full
charged
improvement, as well as stage manufacture
These charges,
and field operations.
undertaken and paid profitably (oecause
nave included
they were economical),
pro-rata shares of all Delta's many
stair-step growth developments. They have
also included cost of all problem pursuits
and failure investigations through all
remedies and improvements. For many years,
no
had
has
taxpayer
American
the
development or underwriting burden from the
Delta. He has paid for it only when used
as the vehicle for a Government launch. It
should be noted that the Castor IV (3900)
and PAM-D upgrades of the Delta's launch
capability were the first commercial space
launch vehicle programs. These programs
were commercially funded by McDonnell
Douglas with development cost recovery
through commercial foreign sales.
A share of the cost control and
reliability has been in the field. While
the Delta is largely manfactured in
Huntington Beach, California, the stacking
and completion of the vehicle on its launch
pad entails field assembly of over ten
In complexity of
thousand components.
assembly, with the nine strap-on solid
motors, their quick separation systems and
all the thermal protection provisions that
must go with them, the field preparation of
Delta is equal to or greater than the
effort required to stack and prepare any
other expendable, multi-stage vehicle, yet
the manpower to accomplish these tasks has
been characteristically less than for other
vehicles, as shown in Table -I-.

TABLE -I«

Delta

TYPICAL (1981-1982) LAUNCH TEAM PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Task
Figure Of Merit
Head Count Launches/Year Complexity
Factor (C.F.) (LR X 1000 CF/HC)
(Total)
(H/C)
39 - 6
1
9
227
708

7

0.90

8.9

Atlas & Centaur 485

6

0.8

9.9

Titan
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One
of
the
reasons
for
Delta
reliability at modest cost has been
improvements in field preparation. These
improvements were not random but were
consciously introduced based on a study of
hard experiences in our industry. They
were designed and introduced in the early
'70s as a group of coherent facets intended
to provide a unified solution to many
problems of launch operations in the field,
from preventing flight failure, damage and
injury, to avoiding excessive expenditures
of cost and time. They were aimed at
mission success at moderate price.

field misinstallation of a rate gyro. That
gyro was installed misclocked, and an
inconclusive test, intended to find such a
problem, did not. Validity of the test
itself had not been tested out was
assumed. In October 1971 Delta 86 was lost
because of a vent valve leak on the second
stage that could have been detected on the
launch pad.
Other problems on other
programs studied included the inter-aqency
communications lack whicn led to the
Gemini/Agena mission failure known as "The
Angry Alligator," and the explosion of the
"T-Bird" (first test vehicle of the Saturn
S-II)
which
was
destroyed
on
the
Mississippi
test
stand
through
communication
error
and
assumption
(pressurizing
main
tanks
with
a
disconnected pressure transducer).

A Change From Early Beginnings
First
launches of
long
distance
vehicles were tests of weapons.
While
success was urgently desired, correct
performance by 65% of the missions was
acceptable.
The
field
effort
was
developmental.
The value at risk was
little more than that of the launch
vehicle.
However, in the launching of
satellites to orbit,
the values of
spacecraft exceeded values of the launch
vehicles, sometimes by an order of
magnitude. Failure was dear and painful.
It was the anguish of early hard
experiences that led to formulation of a
field philosophy within the McDonnell
Douglas launch crews. This formulation was
particularly catalyzed by the Vandenberg
AFB loss of the NASA Thor Agena for
Nimbus-B, where the payload estimated cost
was about $200 million in 1968 dollars and
that of the first stage vehicle which
caused the failure less than a million.
Other experiences were studied.
These
experiences were not limited to Delta but
included those known from Thor, Atlas,
Centaur, Titan, Vanguard, Navajo, Agena,
and other rockets.

Other less dramatic problem aspects of
the then Douglas Company field work were
studied for factors of delay, hazards and
expense.
It was learned that on Thor and Delta
launch complexes,
as
exist
in
all
organizations, there were opportunities for
improvement. Errors had been introduced
through the replacement of comoonents for
preventive
maintenance. A trial policy
change was made to halt much of this
prescheduled replacement. It was seen that
more manhours had been consumed in
correction of misinstallations than was
saved by this maintenance, that components
left in place continued working well long
after expiry of their arbitrary maintenance
schedules.
Not removing them not only
saved the replacement and retest efforts,
but
avoided
system
disruptions,
possibilities of contamination and many
scheduling headaches.
Risks of failure
were evaluated component by component.

A field improvement study was set in
"motion by McDonnell Douglas Field Site
Management, the objective was to determine
common causes for problems and from them,
opportunities
for
improving
field
operations. For the study, done by field
operations supervisors, field-preventable
or field-caused flight or static test
failures were the most dramatic lessons.

From
study
results
most
scheduled
maintenance was stopped; systems were in
constant use and therefore of known
condition. "Fix it when it breaks" was
adopted as a final policy with eminent
success.
The
study
also
revealed
telluu
that
departments,
though
trying
to
work
together, used paper forms unshared by
other departments. Team personnel of other
departments who needed to be involved had
no access to one another's paper and were
therefore
uninformed.
From
this
observation came the policy of using a
single,
all-department
documentation
system,
accountable
for
all
launch
processing actions and used by, and
contributed to, by all departments. This
became known as the LPD (Launch Processing
Document), Its use was developed into a
highly
refined
but
straightforward

In 1957, the first launch of a Thor
detonated on liftoff due to contamination.
In 1958, at Sacramento Field Test Station
in California, a test of a Thor liquid
oxygen transfer sled killed three worxers
and severely injured others, owing to
nylon in LOX and aggravated by poor test
and personnel control. A Delta solid motor
accident at Cape Canaveral in 1964 killed
three workers,
a result
of static
discharge. In May of 1968, the Nimbus-B
mission from Vandenberg was lost because of
4-3

greater
with
fashion,
less
with
and
mechanization,
chance for operator error. These
equipments came into being and
formed a major part of the Delta
Examples
Launch Sites culture.
are discussed in this paper.

operating system, computer maintained, and
tracked for completion of each test
See
requirement and each installation.
Figure -1-.
A study of main causes of manhours
consumed at the launch sites revealed three
primary areas where expenditure of manhours
was high but avoidable: largest was the
domain of retest and re-exercise owing to
test data indicating anomalies or system
Unfortunately these
performance errors .
were found to be so frequent and were so
habitually resolved to be "no problem" by
repetitive further testing, that they were
interpreted not as failures but as system
"uncertainties." Tabulations of tests and
efforts over a number of Thor and Delta
launches at Vandenberg AFB showed a high
incidence of "uncertainty" developing in
tested systems owing to questionable data
subsequent
or
original
taken during
testing. Many test repeats studied did not
indicate a high rate of actual system or
It had been the
component failure.
practice to retest many times on the
mechanism
actual
that
understanding
problems do not come and go, but -- once
there -- can be repeated and understood.
This was a "crude confidence" approach. It
was observed that multiple tests tend to be
done with increasingly systematic care.
When a data-taking problem occurred,
multiple test was the method used to
distinguish this from a real system problem
This
and to gain system confidence.
method, once reviewed in perspective, was
considered poor in contrast to avoidance of
bad data-taking in the first place.

Develop rigorously studied and
prepared procedures, refined by
test and use.
Adhere to these tightly on launch
after launch, changing only with
strong reason and great care.
Increase attention to test and
operation management such that a
countdown
and
conductor
test
format is used on essentially all
vehicle operations.
Second largest area of reducible
manhour consumption was the domain of
retesting done to give a currency to system
Since launch delays for
confidence.
reasons otner than the readiness of the
rocket often occurred, they were considered
"normal." The "health" or launch-readiness
of systems was known to decay (as testified
by problems found in these retests).
Testing was therefore planned on a
repeating and periodic basis. The study
perused past records for causes of
readiness decay where it actually had been
found.Some decay of tested condition was
noted due to moisture intrusion in
circuits. None was found due to aging of
None was found due to
soft goods.
corrosion or other chemical change (in the
one
Only
involved).
times
short
substantial factor was found to justify the
erosion of confidence in tested readiness:
Human access.

large
a very
showed
study
Tne
proportion of all test uncertainties were
due to improper data, resulting from
human
poor
performance,
careless
verbal
on
reliance
or
observation,
reporting without written follow-up.

Access to tested flight hardware had
not customarily been prevented. Intrusions
were numerous and, taken one by one, each
generally carried good reason. Access was
informal in opening flight boxes, entering
ground terminal boards, breaking into gas
etc.
lines,
propellant
supplies,
Individually, each action generally was
driven by a well-meaning sponsor interested
in rechecking a set of terminators or in
"better"
and
later
a
incorporating
modification. But as a whole, such access
was destructive.

Causes were often:
Lack of complete readiness for the
tests, leading to carelessness.
of
Lack
understanding.
t

thorough

team

Poor initial plan or a late change
to the plan leading to confusion,
performance errors, or data-taking
methods that were unsystematic.

Also there was casual access -- human
presence which focused on one objective in
one system while accidentaly disturbing
another; wrong placing of a foot or hand, a
dropped wire strand or a pocket pencil.

From this observation arose policies to:
Design and build test equipment
which will take data in recorded
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launch site) oy virtue of their
component physical nature. These
after
test
require
features
vehicle emplacement on the launch
pad to assure specific performance
characteristics have remained.

access
that
concluded
study
The
invalidation of tests could be avoided by:
Exclusion of access where possible.
Rigorously controlling access to
inserting
and
systems,
tested
special care where sucn access was
imperative.

Those tests and operations which
our experience has taught are
for
necessary
and
prudent
contingency reasons or which are
required on a Government range.
These are as much a listing of
what to avoid as what to do.

Implementing policies to mandate
system closure after test.
These actions were taken. Periodic and
repeating test were largely dropped.

On the Delta Program, two documents
(Test
TRD
a
former
the
resulted,
Requirements Document) and the latter an
ORD (Operating Requirements Document).

The third area of manhour expenditure
"Habitual
found to be reducible was:
Testing." This is testing for which the
reason -- once clear to someone -- is no
is known,
Or if it
longer Known.
an
of
refragmentation
a
represents
integrated system into components. This is
a natural trend where a test engineering
department is divided into disciplines. In
the testing studied, a notable example was
seen: the internal disconnect of the
guidance system from the hydraulic system.
The hydraulic engineers had always required
the VATS (Valve Actuator Test Set) to be
employed to drive the hydraulic system to
full stops. The reason, when asked, was to
assure the main engine did not strike the
However the
legs of the launch mount.
electrical disconnecting had accounted for
numerous severe damages to the flight
control electronics, due to uncoordinated
turn-on in the unloaded (disconnected)
condition.

Finally the study brought forth the
realization that much time and labor was
flight
error-driven
to
due
expended
equipment damage and its subsequent repair,
was
This
retest.
and
replacement,
particularly caused by test set-up damage.
It occurred on electrical connectors (bent
systems
clean
in
and
pins)
(contamination). Testing had traditionally
been done with set up and tear down
test. This
each
preceding and following
meant much set up traffic and much damage.
From this realization sprang a feature of
the field philosophy which thereafter
shaped the development of new test
equipment and a simpler test flow. It had
the objective of making a single hookup of
ground test systems to a launch venicle and
having just a single removal.
all
for
need
showed
study
The
operations to be under direction of a
system-wise,
time,
real
senior
multi-disciplined test authority. The real
time Test Conductor over all agencies was
needed to keep operations technically and
His necessary
operationally compatible.
functions included the promulgation of
understanding between all active parties on
a single launch pad. This is a function of
it
do
To
communications management.
properly, operations must be conducted on a
By acting as the
communications net.
"Blind Man" on the net the "TC" can induce
team members to verbalize events, thus
promoting a wide distribution of team
understanding.
Other vital outcomes were also arrived
at for sound reasons, as outlined in the
fie^ philosophy to which these inquiries
gave rise:

This example of "Habitual Testing" was
averted' by cutting away launch mount legs
for clearance to remove all probability of
The break-in to this
engine contact.
done
longer
no
was
system
tested
hydraulic
vehicle
Flight
routinely.
testing was accomplished only through
flight electronics. Damage to the flight
controller ceased.
From this study of manhour consumption
came a realization that testing by somewhat
blind, habitual repetition of what had been
done earlier led to inappropriate testing.
Such testing, as conditions changed in the
development of a program and its flight
hardware, may no longer be warranted
without some vehicle of oetter analytical
perspective.
The idea of an aostract of "testing
requirements" came. For convenience, this
was divided into two general listings:
t

Plan testing and operations in
detai1 , in advance.
test
operations
Control
hierarchically.

Those tests of specific systems
(and specific components, where
necessary) needed late (at the
4-5

Do not shortcut plan for haste or
hurry; remember the high value of
the hardware you handle. Shortest
course is a studied course.

Maintain ground equipment through
necessary repairs discovered in
frequent use rather than through
extensive
replacements
in
a
maintenance program.

t

Include all departments in a
single plan. Let them operate as
a team, not as factions.
test
and
Mechanize
tests
equipments to:
. Reduce operator variability
. Reduce data judgement error
. Increase data validity.

Develop
and
maintain
highest
disciplines of crew performance in
terms of:
. Precision
. Observation and report
. Communication.
Germinate and cultivate a special
anomaly handling
culture:
any
single player can report an
anomaly.
No single player can
adjudicate an anomaly. Unexpected
observations are (1) registered,
(2) developed for full factual
substance,
(3)
widely
communicated, (4) variously judged
by all
concerned agents and
groups, and (5) accepted only in
concensus.

Restrict and control access to
tested hardware, botn ground and
flight.
Divide launch site processing into
domains:
. Assembly of rocket
. Test preparation
. Systems testing
. Test systems removal
. Flight preparation
. Launch countdown.

Implementation of these study results
into the Delta field processing involved
transition into new people disciplines, new
paper systems and thecreationof new
precision equTpments.
New
families
of
equipment
were
necessary to carry out the philosophical
objectives of reducing:

Organize work paper to be:
. A coherent plan.
. Used and understood by all
departments.
. Best thought inputs of all
departments.
* Sequenced, detailed, step by
step instruction, organized in
timeliness so that details are
given when to be used, rather
than as "boilerplate 1 to be
unheeded.
. Devoid of vague generalities
that can be someone's excuse
that
foretnought
and
instructions
are
contained
whi le
they
may
not
be
effectively contained.
. Graphically i11u s trated.
. Va 1 i d at ed1
point
by
po i nt,
progressively.
. Au g me in t ed" w i t h
interpretive
notes.
. A record of all that has
- happened.
. Evaluated by engineers and
managers in later making the
case for readiness to launch.

Manpower costs
Motion and time to/of test
Misperformances
Mis-taking of data
Unintended abuse to flight
hardware.
These equipments had to be designed.
They were conceived by field personnel and
largely designed in the field (to use to
best advantage the knowledge of systems and
of test problems held by the field
engineers). This tasK also provided mind
and talent honing challenges to the field
engineers while at the same time avoiding
costs by more productive utilization of
time between tests.
Similarly, these
equipments were largely built in the field
to utilize the talents of the field
technicians and minimize cost.
The design factors to be achieved
within the limits of time and with little
additional money were:
Capability to be connected once in
the launch campaign.

Do a11 operations accord i ng to
coordi mated,
de1i berated
plan.
Where plan needs change (due to
i n ad e q u. acy, c h a n g i n g condition s »
malfunction or troubleshooting),
re plan.

Capability to operate
in
programmed, hands-off mode.
Capability to take recorded data.
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Capability to take data remotely
on high-hazard systems, therefore
make possible the thorough testing
of these systems witnout undue
exposure of personnel.
When hazardous systems require
human presence, to provide full
and best protection.

the RACS monitors, Figure -5-, were devised
to convert gas puffs into electrical
addition they protected
In
signals.
nozzles. Receptor Venturis were connected
to inexpensive bellows switches with tygon
tubing. Their switch closures were then
registered along with ordnance signals on
the DOTS chart recorders.
The DOTS was able to bring test
a
of
virtue
by
indoors
equipments
That this
specially-ouilt gantry room.
system could then remain connected to the
launcn
entire
the
during
launch vehicle
testing period of each rocket's launch
campaign eliminated most connect/disconnect
damage. Reduction of ordnance-firing and
jet-firing data to timed record eliminated
much need for retesting.

Additional to the more proficient
taking of data was the design
objective of better assimilation
of data taken.
Resulting were the following
Site testing and operating systems:

Launch

DOTS: The Delta Ordnance Test System was
appropriately the first of the ground
equipment improvements because the Delta is
a heavy user of ordnance-activated devices
been
had
difficulty
data
much
and
encountered in assuring all ordnance firing
commands were emanating on time and in
correct magnitude from the vehicle to the
several electro-explosive devices (EED's).
The DOTS replaced a collage of test devices
which used flashbulbs and circuit oreakers
without timing or recorders; they were for
perceiving electrical firing commands at
The old
ordnance device connectors .
systems used short cables to connect to the
three stages separately. Tney were coupled
before each test and removed promptly
afterward. This had oeen necessary because
Delta gantries were open. Equipments could
not reasonably be left exposed to weather
for extended periods.

The number of Delta retests
FLOPI:
required by misoperation during the largest
of all tests, the multi-stage flight
simulation, was exorbitant. Manhours and
Most often
schedule days were wasted.
miscued was the pulling of the "liftoff
pins." These pins are part of the launch
mount and actuate vehicle switches as they
leave their vehicle nacelles at liftoff.
They signal the vehicle systems to perform
There are two, on
the flight program.
opposite sides of the rocket base plane and
are pulled, hopefully, on the right second
by two independent technicians listening to
One or both were often
a count.
(Flight Lifoff Pin
FLOPI
mis-timed.
a
implemented
Initiator)
blockhouse-originated signal to pull the
The
actuators.
pins using pneumatic
resultant precision virtually suspended
this frequent cause for retest.

An indoor central console, Figure -2-,
was used with "octopus cables" reaching to
every ordnance connector on the 3-stage
vehicle. Signal occurrences was thereafter
recorded with respect to range timing.
Further, the intensity and duration of the
bridge wire currents were monitored for
adequacy by special modules mounted in the
load contact boxes (Figure -3-) and were
limited such that errant values could not
This
wiring.
venicle
launch
injure
monitoring and limiting was accomplished oy
ordnance simulator modules adapted from
surplus gear of the Saturn Program and
built into DOTS.

OCAT: The possession of the DOTS gave rise
to a new opportunity to eliminate another
the
labor,
time-consuming
of
source
detailed pin-to-pin measurement of stray
voltage on the ordnance circuits of the
vehicle at the time of final ordnance
connection. One of the development efforts
of the Delta Launch Team had been the
shortening of the long countdown on launch
day. A task of that day has always been
the arming of the strap-on solid motors.
To accomplish this quickly required arming
through one large connector rather than at
the many individual detonator points, as
traditional. However, it was our safety
policy - in pre-connection measuring to
assure no stray voltage present on ordnance
circuits - to measure not only the absence
of spurious voltage across the wires
leading to each oridge wire, but also to
measure from every pin In each connector to
every other pin and to the shell of each
In small, two or four-wire
connector.
connectors, this is a manageable tasK for

In pre-DOTS times, another variety of
data had been perceived and reported by a
The second stage
most imprecise means.
attitude control cold gas jets were noted
to "fire" oy men listening nearby. Timing
was absent or inaccurate. The certainty of
which jets fired when, often dissolved in
confusion and differences of opinion.
Small protective assemblies being otherwise
needed to protect the fragile jet nozzles,
4-7

manual measurements.
In connectors of
large size, the permutations of measurement
cause the task to grow enormously.
A
computer or other automation medium was
needed.
Thus
a major
stimulus
for
developing OCAT was this need to arm solid
motors out of a single, large connector.

EEDAT: Although redundancy has been used
in the Delta ordnance system design,
failure of electro-explosive devices could
cause
mission
failure.
Therefore,
confirmation of EED integrity as late as
possible
oefore
installation
is
an
important action for mission success. The
traditional method of handling and testing
EED's sucn as explosive oolts, pyrotechnic
cable cutters and small actuation rockets
involved days of hands-on testing.
Men
travelled to ordnance bunkers and employed
Alinco meters, test leads, and pin sleeves
to measure painstakingly -- and at some
hazard -- the continuity and resistance of
all the oridge wires in all the EED's, both
primaries and spares. For multi-stage
Delta, ordnance checKout could take as long
as five days. Many man days were consumed
per mission in his activity. Even thVn,
the testing was necessarily completed long
before installation. Retesting in cases of
abort were equally time consuming. Despite
care and proficiency, there were errors and
uncertainties.

The computer driven measurement system
which became known as OCAT was, in 1972,
merely an adaptation of the HP2100 ground
resident computer newly supplied to the
launch locations to interface with the
on-board flight computer.
This computer
was first flown on Delta in July 1972.
OCAT extended the use of the HP2100
computer in tne blockhouse to work througn
the DOTS (which was already normally
connected most of the time to every
ordnance circuit on the rocket).
The
ground computer's time free from its
occasional use in commanding the on-board
computer, was not greatly impacted by new
employment. OCAT was implemented by adding
late technology wire wrap circuitry, arrays
of reed relays, and digital voltmeters to
the DOTS.
Tnis accommodated computer
access and provided switching capability to
each of tne DOTS rocket ordnance circuits.
By -this means the blockhouse computer
became able to address all vehicle ordnance
circuits and to switch any two to a digital
voltmeter
system
located
near
the
rocket-side within the DOTS connection
boxes.
With programming, OCAT was then
able to profile in rapid sequence all
ordnance circuits on the rocket for
resistance, isolation, and stray voltage.
The judging of the measurements was also
programmed so that, while all results were
printed out
for human perusal,
all
unsatisfactory readings were flagged. OCAT
also provided such capability to the main
solid motor initiation and separation
connector.
By means of OCAT it became
possible thereafter to accomplish all
pretest, post-test and pre-arming surveys
of the condition and health of all ordnance
firing
circuits
promptly,
with
hign
confidence, few delays, and with a minimum
of manpower.
By the incorporation of
continuous monitor and alarm circuits, it
also became possible to watcn for the
presence of any significant stray voltage
continuously and to record any such voltage
for later time correlation with passing
electrical storms, work access, or other
events.

The EEDAT (Electro-explosive Device
Automatic Tester) converted this chore to
systematic
good
results.
EEDAT
was
conceived as the marriage of an ordnance
safety system to the computer driven
measurement and readout system of OCAT.
Actually they were a symbiotic development,
as the germ ideas of each affected the
final outcome of both. The ordnance safety
was provided by designing new ordnance
carrying cases (Figure -6-). These were
"Haliburton cases"
fitted with
stout
aluminum/steel manifolds to hold sets of
ordnance safely. Even if the case is hand
neld, and all ordnance devices detonate
simultaneously, the manifold contains and
safely bleeds down resultant pressures.
The design was proven by test. A cable
harness inside the case is made to connect
to each of the EED's and to an external
connector on the surface of the case.
During all handling except actual device
testing,
this
external
connector
is
"shorted" with a faraday cap. In routine
use, manifolded cases are provided for a
complete ship-set of EED's plus spares.
EED's are only inspected physically, then
loaded into the manifolds by screwing into
the ports. This occurs at the ordnance
storage bunker.
Thereafter the ordnance
can be safely carried and even stored at
the rocket-side until ready for testing.

OCAT reduced the the amount of time
required to arm the launch vehicle from
expenditure of many hours,
by many
technicians, to the spending of minutes by
a few.
It made many fewer errors and
produced more accurate data, all with a net
reduction of hazard exposure.

The coupling of tne EEDAT box to the
computer-driven readout system (Figure -7-)
involved
only
the
addition
of
a
current-limited signal injection feature
and simple cable connection to the OCAT
system. A software program was provided to
the blockhouse computer for driving this
system. By this means, small currents are
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an array at the top of a low pressure box.
A vacuum pump maintains the internal
box"
"scavenge
tnis
of
pressure
substantially below atmospheric' pressure.

sent in succession through each of the EED
bridge wires. The resulting infinitesimal
voltage drops across the bridge wires are
wire
bridge
ascertain
to
measured
The automatic measurement,
resistance.
immediately
instant,
an
in
oerformed
precedes installation of explosive devices
By means of EEDAT the
in the rocket.
earlier logistics problems surrounding the
handling of ordnance were eliminated with
added safety and with greater validity of
checkout of each EED at the time of
installation. After a decade of use, EEDAT
has made thousands of measurements through
the bridge wires of live ordnance without
an instance of dudding or detonation.

As a result, a steady flow of ambient air
proceeds into the open end of the tubules
and toward the scavenge box. Over the open
end of each tubule a loose envelope of
foil, usually aluminum, is formed around
the joint to be leak tested. The launch
pad area is cleared of personnel, and the
rocket systems are brought to full flight
a
or
helium
pure
with
pressure
helium-nitrogen mixture. Helium molecules
that escape the joints are swept up by
incoming air and carried off toward the
scavenge box through- the tubules. Inside
the box is an addressing mechanism which
positions the probe of a high vacuum helium
detection device -- sequentially or on
command -- at the injecting point of eacn
tubule. Output is in the form of a mass
spectrometer quantitative indication of
parts per million of helium. Control of
the addressing, dwell time, recording and
is
leakage
detected
of
evaluation
the
in
console
a
at
concentrated
System accuracy is greater
blockhouse.
than needed and periodic self-calibration
is provided by known internal calibrated
The
leaks (0.06, 0.6, 1.0, 8.0 SCCM).
system is able to detect leaks far below
the level of significance for Delta systems
and far below the level detectable by
bubble soap and the human eye.

RLE: Leak detection in lightweight flight
systems has long been the predicate of
Design margins in such
field problems.
systems are often low for purposes of
1.4
to
1.2
conservation,
weight
being
pressures
Durst-over-operating
Such systems cannot be safely
common.
Leak
approached when fully pressurized.
detection by traditional methods of Dubble
solution and observation must be done at
much lower pressures. For systems which
must remain in space without body moments
or losses from gas leaks, a complete and
accurate leak check is mandatory. Leak
check oy the decay method was long the only
available means to assure leak tightness of
such systems. This was time consuming and
often produced inexact results during the
hours of diurnal temperature variation.
Also, the method was only valid if there
were no leaks. If leaks were present, it
was impossible to locate them at full
If they were the type leaks
pressure.
which only appear at high pressure, then
the location and repair became an entire
impossiblity. These facts, plus the loss
of Delta 86 because of a small leak on the
second stage, were the stimuli for the
invention and development of the RLE
(Remote Leak Evaluator) sytem.

In the ten
have been some
and calibration
known to fail
vehicle leak to

years of use, while there
infrequent machine startup
problems, RLE has not been
in detection of a launch
which it was exposed.

Loading propellants in the Delta
BAS:
entirely
done
not
is
stage
second
remotely. It is accomplished in the final
The propellants,
days before flight.
nitrogen tetroxide and Aerozine 50, are
highly toxic. To be quite certain the load
is locked aboard without leakage and to
minimize vehicle weight, fly-away quick
All nose
disconnects are not used.
connections and disconnections, as well as
final load adjustments are made by men at
The propellants are
the rocket side.
driven aloft to the second stage by
pressurization of trailer-mounted storage
tanks. While this operation is controlled
by switches from the blockhouse, certain
valve settings as well as confirmations of
flow, sightglass levels and scale poise
conditions, require men at the storage
these men
co protect
Means
units.
completely in an envelope of clean, fresh
air is necessary wnen nandling tne nignly
toxic Delta second stage propellants.

Conceived and designed by launch site
engineers, perfected in 1973 through a
series of prototyping and proving test, and
used proficiently on all Delta launch pads
through the decade since that time, RLE has
brought to launch processing of liquid
rocket stages a new dimension of leak-free
certainty. (Figures -8- and -9-)
The principle of operation is simple
(refer to Figure -10-). A tracer gas is
injected into venicle systems. Helium is
used because of its safety and mobility.
The exterior of each rocket system to be
tested is laced with a harness of 1/8 11
nylon tubules, one for each possible leak
address, and a few for general area
detection. These are numbered and brought
in harness form off the launch vehicle into
4-9

QUIPU: This system, named for tne earliest
of computation systems (tne Inca Indian set
of knotted strings pronounced: "kee-poo")
was a combination of HP1000 computer and
Gould nigh speed jet printer with a set of
telemetry/land line
and
monitors
CRT
primarily from
instrumentation coming,
launch vehicle systems (Figure -14-). It
was designed and built in 1974, again to
produce an efficiency and an effectiveness
in launch preparation testing and a care in
It is, in effect, an
data handling.
automated data engineer. QUIPU coverts all
data instantly to engineering units, a
time.
engineering
of
saving
great
Superimposed on the unsophisticated Delta
"finger-and-switch" ground test control
system, it operates to monitor redlines
during tests and to read and summarize test
Redlines and operating
results rapidly.
in
progressively
changed
are
limits
synchronism with system condition. QUIPU's
the
confirm
to
been
has
benefit
acceptability quickly after a day of
not
out
relieving,
somewhat
testing,
entirely replacing, the long hours of
reading strip cnarts and data analysis,
which earlier held launch engineers into
the nignt. QUPIU monitors differences on
selected parameters through the succession
of tests and helps detect degradation
trends of transducers, should they occur.

First use of tne standard, liquid air
pack, "SCAPE" suits at the Delta complex at
and
cm lied
produced
AFB
Vanglenberg
Medical qualifications
fatigued workers.
to use these suits involved stress testing
wnicn only a portion of the rather "senior"
corps of McDonnell Douglas tecnnicians on
the Delta Program could pass. Crew-suited
full
a
requiring
limited,
time was
complement relief crew to oe utilized for
each propellanc loading operation. In the
small contingent Delta launch team these
requirements posed economic as well as
In
factors.
discomfort
and
nazard
the
from
launches
Delta
addition,
California location required the transport
of a SCAPE suit support group, plus
equipment, across tne continent for each
mission. For the cost of one such mission,
the BAS (Breathing Air System) was designed
by McDonnell Douglas and built by launch
site technicians out of surplus SCAPE suits.
Tne original BAS utilized a trailer of
Del Monox diving air filters to purify the
output of an ordinary construction site,
diesel air compressor (Figure -12-). Tnis
crailer was equipped with a carbon monoxi'de
sensor and alarm system. Its output fed a
system of manifolds and noses aoout tne
launch complex from which, at distribution
points, suited workers took their air
supply via hoses. Into the surplus SCAPE
suits McDonnell Douglas engineers designed
changes; liquid air packs were removed;
hose attacnments were mounted at waist
internal
the
into
tied
and
level
distrioution system; vortex tubes of small
dimensions and no moving parts were
incorporated to sort not from cold incoming
air molecules for the user to adjust his
an emergency egress
temperature;
own
air-bottle attachment was incorporated; and
finally communications were installed in
the helmets to make them compatible with
The rework was
the launch pad nets.
accomplished in contract scope by McDonnell
These suits were
Douglas technicians.
tried and found to offer a much lower
fatigue and stress level to the user and to
offer an economic oonus over tne original
SCAPE suits, now referred to as Category I
On the California Delta launch
SCAPE.
complex these suits have remained in use
In the first drop
for twelve years.
testing of the Snuttle at NASA's Dryden
Center, these suits were borrowed, together
air filtration
supporting
tneir
with
system, and found to oe satisfactory in
servicing Shuttle hypergolic propellants.
This type of suit protection was recognized
with a new NASA name: Category IV SCAPE
and is now in wide service on STS. Delta
operations at KSC were converted to this
system in 1981, and maintenance of the
suits is now accomplished by McDonnell
Douglas at low cost.

SUMMARY
in this paper
presented
Material
outlines the holistic approach to field
operations whicn grew out of lessons in
disaster and which has been used with good
results on the Delta Program for more than
a decade. Change was effected not alone in
of planning,
instruments
and
methods
field
documenting
and
performing
operations, not alone in the structure and
fit of paper systems to ma*<e them most
effective, and not alone in the disciplines
of test and assembly operations, nor in the
equipments and instruments of taking and
preserving data. Changes were made in all
of these. They were harmonious changes,
striving toward a common goal of focussed,
effective processing with least confusion,
least repeat, least damage, and least
oversight.
The nolistic approach, tried and tested
a decade with Delta, is recommended for
other large launch programs or large field
undertakings.
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